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ABSTRACT
Constitutions should say no. The treaty of Lisbon, though no real constitution,
definitely says yes to almost all possible spending and taxing possibilities of the
European Union (EtD. There is no limitation to the tasks the EU can do; the
principles of subsidiarity and proportionality are, in this respect, no effective
safeguards for restraints in the political process. In a public consultation paper, the
European Commission asks its citizens and Member States to come up with ideas
how to reform the EU Budget. The key research challenge of our paper---to
answer the consultation paper---is to give a novel angle from the point of
constitutional economics towards the selection among the altemative budgetary
powers made available to the EU. Our central question is: How to reform the EU
Budget? Our central goal is to limit and hence to trust the EU Leviathan.
Keywords: Constitutional Political Economy, EU budget
BACKGROUND AND APPROACII TO TIIE PROBLEM
After the rejection of the draft Constitutional Treaty (2004) in 2005 by French and
Dutch voters, a revised Treaty (2001) is put up for ratification in the Member
States. If ratified, it will enter into force on I January 2009. A revision of the
budgetary powers of the EU, however, should be a priority. Why? It the 'no' of
the French and Dutch citizens was a revolution, the truth counts that at least halve
of all historic revolutions were fiscal revolutions (Net 2002). Citizens do want to
feel protected from an almost automatically ever-growing EU budget. If it should
grow, it should grow willingly and by the consent of the citizens. Hence the
consultation call by the European Commission (2007) is, in the words of Dalia
Grybauskaite (European Commissioner for Financial Programming and Budget),
indeed, a 'unique, may be once-in-a-lifetime opportunity', to discuss a
fundamental review of the EU Budget.
The rðad towards a revised budget as suggested by the Commission's
consultation paper, just as the approach after the rejection of the draft
Constitutional Treaty, can be a very toilsome process inside the realm of partisan
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(Member States') advocacy. Solidarity, for instance, has to be bought with
financial pet projects for individual Member States. Or, alternatively, budget
reform is discussed by the direct application of abstract ethical nonns in a vacuous
(without a model of governmental-political behavior) institutional setting.
Moreover, fiscal decision-making is often based on the rule that policies
have to pose as little resistance as possible for the majority that must approve of
them. The feeling, often, dominates that someone else pays (Spicer, 1995). To
trust on the goodwill of the Member States or the members of the European
Parliament is no solution either. In the four years before 2005, no member of the
US congress has on total voted for a reduction in government outlays, though the
rhetoric to speak of fiscal discipline was on the rise (Dircksen, 2005).
The paper shifts the grounds for the debate on the reform of the EU budget
towards a fundamental review: it focuses on the choices among quasi-permanent
constraints (within which alternatives should the EU's budgetary powers be
exercised) and not, as is usually the case on choices within given constraints. The
paper adopts a rule-based perspective on the EU Budget: we do choose budgetary
rules of which we know that, onoe selected, they will remain in being over an
indeterminately long sequence of budgetary periods. We should take literally
Grybauskaites remark about an "once-in-a-lifetime possibilþ". The rules are
quasi-permanent and long-lived. Members States are unable to predict with
precision what their position will be at any particular moment in the future. In
particular, they are presumed to be unable to identify their position (a veil of
ignorance) either as payer or as spending beneficiary in a sequence of separate
budgetary periods. History shows that these kinds of debate about a framework for
political action, not an instrument thereof, have been possible and fruitful
@uchanan, 2001¡, Elster, 1 99 1).
The paper, also, stays within the framework of an individualistic market
ec'onomy. Why does the Treaty of Lisbon (2007) set out individual freedom as one
of the core values of the EU? It is a good in itself; it represents human nature. We
can only make real choices based on individual freedom. Freedom is also essential
to develop as a moral being. Man is first and for all a spiritual being. The choices,
e.g., we make to help other people, have to be taken in freedom.
Individual freedom, however, is also a necessity for our economic order:
the market economy. Not only, quite visible, the climate and the physical
characteristics of the Member States do differ, but, less visible, though of more
importance, also men in their preferences and knowledge do differ. A market
economy, as has been emphasized by the Austrian-bom economist Friedrich
Hayek, is to make optimal use of those differences in knowledge (1982, Vol. 1).
Hence, the problem in a market economy is not to give the central authorities, be it
Brussels or a local government, all the extra knowledge it needs to pursue policy.
The problem is to give each individual all the extra knowledge he needs, mostly in
the form of price (profit) signals, so he can decide for himself how to pursue his
own goals. In this way, society does make use of often-unique knowledge of local
circumstances and preferences that do differ in time. Knowledge that is diffrcult to
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centralize. An idea as valid for individuals as for countries and has found its
expression, though unsuccessfully as areal constraint o the EU budget, in the idea
of subsidiarity.
The focus of the paper is on the normative evaluation of budgetary rules.
We do also suggest that those rules do create trust and facilitates a robust
democratic debate. The emphasis is not, as is usually the case, based on a
benevolent EU, to enhance economic effrciency (making the EU 'work better')
and/or to increase the equity of budget rules. We will put to test a dif[erent
approach: an analysis that we define by the limits it places on the powers of
Brussels, an egoistic despot, to 'tax and spend'. Though the model of a budget-
maximizing Leviathan-like EU bureaucracy, a discretionary agency, may seem
extreme, the norms laid down may possible prove acceptable as embodying a
minimax strategy: to ensure that the best remains a possibility by guarding against
the worst.
POLITICAL ECONOMY
In the middle of the previous century, Hayek (1939; cf. Hayek 1949, pp. 255-72)
wrote that democracy caî only under very restricted conditions be transposed to a
supra-national organtzation. His American counter-ego Milton Friedman said the
same as far as finances are concerned. If you apply both ideas to the situation in
Europe, we have to conclude that the EU is not only missing the necessary
homogeneity to form clear policy goals in a democratic way, but it misses as well
the stimuli not to waste money.
FRIEDRICH IUYEK
Why is it so hard to expect concrete policy goals and fiscal constraint from the
European parliament---the most democratic institution of the EU? Of course, very
general objectives (e.g., prosperity for everyone) will be easy to agree on. After
that, however, it becomes difficult. Concrete objectives will be difficult to
formulate. The countries of the EU differ too much in culture, history and
economic development. Every choice supposes a balancing of the pros and cons
(cp. Hayek, Ll944l, 1986, p. 168). The revised Services Directive of 2006, e.g., is
supposed to show the social face of the EU. No worker from Eastern Europe,
however, will be glad with the 'social protection' of the revised directive or the
'social clause' in the new Treaty of Lisbon. V/ithin a relatively homogeneous
country like the Netherlands, however, the original directive would be no problem.
Every plumber from the north of the Netherlands is welcome in the south.
Likewise, the Netherlands, e.g., is supporting with a low price of gas a national
pride: the agìiculture of vegetables in greenhouses in the west of the country.
However, the very same solidarity for ã, ê.9., Spanish national pride is something
completely different. The same goes for the other way around
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Hence, if a parliament cannot give and agree on policy objectives, the
European Commission remains de facto the administration. Often below the guise,
that it concems only a technical afflair. That is hard to maintain. Over a change in
policy, no matter how technically it does look like, the parliament belongs to
decide. Moreover, also the Commission has to do with the various wishes of the
Member States that do make up the members of the Commission.
Besides that, large countries will never transfer their economic power to
Brussels. The course of events re the reformation of the Pact on Stability and
Growth in the early years of this century and watered down version of the original
rules in 2005 is characteristic thereof. It is naive to expect the same reforms if a
few small countries had broken the rules. Therefore, we can expect that the new
rule on decision-making by the way of a qualified majority, to be introduced in
2014, based on the double majority of Member States and people, 55yo of the
Member States representing at least 650/o of the Union's population, will be
violated if it should be of a disadvantage to large countries.
MILTON FRIEDMAN
The EU, also, has hardly any incentives not to waste money. As Milton Friedman
says, the best guarantee not to waste money is that the same person both owns and
does spend the money (U9791,1981, p. 146). For then we can expect that you loan
on the penny and sees to it that you do get value for your money. Members of
parliaments or commission members, however, do spend others men's money, on
behave of, often again, other men. That is almost a guarantee for ineffective and
inefficient spending. Of members of a local parliament we can expect some
restraint in spending the taxpayers' money of their own citizens. What to think,
however, of aq Fastern-European member of the EU parliament who does spend
the money of West-European taxpayers at projects in Eastern Europe? To sâtisfu
the members of parliament of Western-European countries pork-barrel legislation
will rise. Not much different as is presently the case in the US where the support
of congressional representatives has to be bought with financial presents þet
projects) for their local constituents. In short, we will see more signs along the
roads that state, 'This project has been realized with the help of the EU'. A project,
if the Member State had to decide and pay for itselt it would not have spent the
money on.
In sum, cultural and political differences make it difficult to have a fiscal
constitution in the sense of an all-out democratic process in which majorities do
decide. We can transpose democracy to a supra-national organization only under
very restricted conditions (cp. Gillingham 2003). It is, however, the popular thing
to do. The solidarity and trust that is necessary for concrete policies within the EU
is very tenuous. Even within one country if things do differ like language
(Belgium), rèligion Q.,lorth-Ireland) or economic development (North and South-
Italy) solidarity is hard to find. All of these situations do charactenze the situation
within the European parliament. Policies, no matter how good the inlentions
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behind them, which are possible for each of the countries separately, are no
option for the EU as a whole. Europe lacks the necessary homogeneity; priorities
cannot be set. To transfer authority and hence policy to Brussels has its limits.
Hence, of an (in the future) democratically chosen Chinese parliament with its
approximately 3000 members we can expect more priority setting then by the 751
members of the European parliament. China with its fifty minorities but
overwhelming majority of almost 95 per cent Han Chinese is more a unity then the
27 members of EU are.
CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICAL ECONOI/IY
Constitutional economics is both thinking outside the box and back to basics. For
the EU it is scientifically largely uncharted territory. For James Buchanan the
European constitution is an opportunity, EU citizens need to grasp, for going back
to constitutional basics (1991,I996a). The constitutionalist mindset, however, that
says that persons owe loyalty to the constitution rather than to the government, is
(has become) foreign to European thinking (1996b,2003; cp. Hayek, 1960). The
idea that there are, or should be, any limits on the powers of the govemment has
largely passed from the contemporary scene. This lack of a constitutional mindset
is also part ofthe problem this research program has to tackle.
Of central importance is that constitutionalism can be the core of fiscal
constraints in which subsidiarity (the primary liability for the solution of problems
lies with the smallest functional unit) and the consent of free individuals (trust),
two of the main problems of the EU, are of central importance.
JAMES BUCTANAN
In constitutional economics @ucharnn,200I), we define the rules of the socio-
economic-political game. We have to make two sorts of constitutional decisions.
First, we must choose from possible constitutional (so-called higher law) rules.
Behind a veil of ignorance, countries and people choose electoral and non-
electoral constitutional rules. No one knows his future position. (Of all the
Member States, Germany broke the rules of Pact on Stability and Growth. Though
beforehand Germany was a most unlikely candidate.) It is at this initial
constitutional decision stage, where we choose the basic fiscal arrangements, that
citizens not only can really control the state, but widespread public agreement is
possible (Brennan and Buchanan, 2000). This since the prospect for general
agreement changes dramatically if we allow for some introduction of ignorance
and/or uncertainty into the Member States' calculus. The prospects of agreement
relate directlx to the predicted length of life of the tax reform. Then we will tend to
opt for rules that are ofair'. Hence the measures to be discussed below are meant
not just for the upcoming, 2013, sixth financial framework but 'forever'. Besides,
it is always easier to secure agreement on a set of rules than to secure agreement
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for example on who is our favorite player. The tone of the discussions is
theoretical and argumentative. Gains for all members are real.
Second, we have to state rules for day-to-day policies within the
framework. Making decisions by majority ensures the workability of the political
process. The tone of the discussions is one of weighting up interests and
bargaining @lster, 1991). Ordinary politics, post constitutional choice, tends to be
conflictual. The reformed EU treaty, however, gives unanimous consent a smaller
role, without making the distinction between the just-mentioned two sorts of
decisions.
Part of the diffrculty of our answer is constitutional illiteracy. 'We have to
shore up constitutional understanding: the choice by individuals, who are related
one to another in an anticipated set of interactions, of a reciprocally binding
constraint. Rules and institutions rather than outcomes should be the focus (Hayek,
1960; Sowell, 1999).In general, orthodox public ftnance, with its emphasis on the
direct application of normative criteria to tax arrangements, does not give us an
understanding of observed fiscal processes in the EU nor is it a basis for
improvement on grounds that are acceptable to the taxpayers. As we do test in this
paper, the logic of a constitutional approach can give such an interpretation, just as
it gave an analytic interpretation of the popular tax revolts sweeping across the U.S.
in the late 1970s. A constitution contains a principle-based limitation of the role of
govemment in society and defines the basic rules for ordinary politics. A
constitution is a framework for political action, not an instrument for action.
THREE METIIODS TO CONSTRAIN THE EU LEVIATHAN
If political and cultural dif[erences do exist, and freedom of choice and free
initiative of citizens is important limiting constitutional rules do make sense. There
are no unique constitutional solutions; several combinations of electoral and non-
electoral rules are possible. Also, which reform of the EU budget is necessary? V/e
can look back and learn from history. We look at what did shape the American
fiscal constitution (Friedman, 1986; Hayek, 1960; Sowell, 1999). If the problem is
to carry over tasks to supranational authorities, as is the case in the Treaty of
Lisbon, we do feel protected if these supranational authorities can act on three
provisions. Firstly, and most importantly, on provisions that lay out the (limited)
range and scope of activities that are appropriately to be undertaken. Secondly, on
provisions that state a bicar^neral fiscal (constitutional) framework, and thirdly, on
nondiscriminatory rules.
THE TASKS OF THE EU
If the problèm is how to establish a limited government, we can look at the
constitution of the U.S. In the U.S., two authorities are of interest: the authorities
in each of the states and the federal govemment in V/ashington. Is that not too
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much govemment? Not if both authorities compete with each other in the sense
that they each have their own branch of power. We can guard a branch if a
constitution does support us. Further, as has been said by James Madison, one of
the founders of the American constitution, in the U.S. constitution the central
authorities do have little and limited and the states do have many and large
competences. The former has powers related to foreign policy and national defense.
The latter has powers related to the criminal justice system and the protection of
the family. In the Treaty of Lisbon, however, the opposite seems to be the case:
there seems to be little that does not fall under the jurisdiction of Brussels. The
Treaty describes tasks that the EU has to do under all circumstances (e.g., customs,
competition and monetary policy, fishing, trade and the internal market policy),
tasks that can be appropriated if necessary (e.g., environmental policy and
consumer protection) and tasks the EU supports (e.g., tourism) (Treaty,2004 and
2007).
Power, however, wants more power, all to the good or to the bad. Hence,
every possibility, how artificially, the EU will use to enlarge it. The manner of
subsidizing activities, for instance, enorrnously enhances the influence of the EU.
Suppose the EU gives a subsidy of 50Yo to a certain activity. That is almost
blackmail; no local government, in their good mind, is opposed to it. For the local
authorities the gains of the activity has to be only halve of the total costs (cp.
Edwards, 2005). The pressure to accept the subsidy is enormous. 'Matching'
grants do unlock an acute gold rush.
Even, however, if the given task for the (federal) central authorities is small,
the pressure for growth is enormous. For instance, the EU authorities do have a
stake in border crossing interests. Title 1, art.3:2 and 3 of the new treaty says that
'The Union shall offer its citizens aî area of freedom ... without internal frontiers
and that the Union shall establish an intemal market'. That, however, is a license
for govemment involvement; at leâst it was in the US, in approximately everything.
Look at what did happen in the US. According to the constitution, the federal
authorities may not meddle with agriculture in the separate states. Yet---with the
constitutionally rule and power of the authority over interstate trade in hand---it
states how many acres in the separate states have to remain wasted. How can the
federal authorities motivate this? A farmer did grow grain on his "wasted" land
and fed the grain to his cattle. At first site, no interstate trade seems to take place.
The Supreme Court, however, did argue that if the farmer had not grown grain on
his wasted land, he would have bought it. He, also, influenced the price of grain on
the market and so interstate trade (Snyder, 1998).
In general, even if there is a clear separation of powers and limitation of
tasks, as in the US, central government often grabs the possibility to enlarge its
powers. What then can we expect of the description of tasks in the treaty? In
general, the tasks of the EU tasks are many and hard to control by a democratic
decision-making process. A process in which everyone thinks that other people do
pay for a certain policy and changing majorities have to be bought, time and again.
An ever-increasing government budget might be expected.
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The principles of subsidiarity and proportionality did not give any
restraint in the past and will probably not do in the future. The principle of
subsidiarity says that oin areas which do not fall within the EU's exclusive
competence the Union shall act only if and in so far as the objectives of the
proposed action cannot be sufFrciently achieved by the Member States but can, by
reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved at the
Union level' (art. 5: 3,2007). Under the principle of proportionality, 'the content
and form of Union action shall not exceed what is necessary to achieve the
objectives of the Treaties' (art. 5: 4,2007).
THE INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE OF EU DECISION-MAKING
For Hayek it is necessary to create a Legislative Assembly (upper house) that
states the rules and a Governmental Assembly (ordinary legislature or parliament)
that administrates within those rules (1982, Vol. 3). A new and differently elected
and organized Legislative Assembly should draw up semi-permanent fiscal rules,
and should not be subject to influences of particular groups. In the EU, however,
there is an intentional combination, the decision-making (institutional) triangle, of
the European Commission, the European Council and European Parliament. A1l of
whom state what the budget is and make the policy within it (Treaty, 2004 and
2007). Consequently, the proposed change in policy of the EU from unanimity to
majority rule is no effective constraint on the exercise and growth of EU power
(Brennan and Buchanan, 2000).
Constitutional economics is both thinking outside the box and back to
basics. For the EU it is scientifically largely uncharted territory. Hayek's model of
bicameralism for fiscal powers for example, to my knowledge, has never been part
of any. political agenda. It is thinking outside the box of mainstream public finance.
In due cÒurse, the separate 'tax'ation chamber" can even'grow into an institution
where all legislation in the EU is made independently from the direct policy use of
it.
THE RULE OF I¿IW AND EU NONDISCKIMINATORY RULES ON
SPENDING
Democratic politics should be more than groups or Member States each seeking to
further particular interest. The ultimate justification of collective action should be
the persuasive force of nondiscriminatory objectives (Hayek, 1960). For Buchanan
and Hayek this means the extension of the legal tradition in 'Westem civil order of
nondiscrimination, the rule of law, to the workings of ordinary politics: not limiting
benefits to members of identified groups or countries. Nondiscrimination is already
the rule on the taxing side but not on the spending side of the EU budget. The
principle disqualifies all programs that target persons and Member States who
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qualif,/ in accordance with identification by ethnicity, location, occupation,
industry, or activity (Buchanan, 2000).
CONCLUSION AND SIJMMARY
The EU treaty misses an essential ingredient that should be present: a process by
which whoever has the power can be constrained. This will in effect give a basis
for the founding values of the EU, especially the ones of freedom and the rule of
law. In general, the EU budget hovers between one that redistributes money
between members and one that achieves certain EU-wide policies. The budget is
the cause of many of the bitterest arguments between the Member States. Often,
the objective of spending seems to be to achieve acceptable net balances rather
than agreed policy. It has been said that the EU budget has never been used as a
means to meet the objectives of the Union but rather as a negotiating tool for its
members.
If fiscal dissatisfaction in the EU is the result of a growing tendency in
which majorities do decide, and hence does give changing majority coalitions
political authority and hence the opportunity to finance their special interests,
within that framework we can never solve the problem. There is another
possibility. Form the point of view of constitutional economics three things are
necessary. One, we need a fiscal constitution on the bases of a clearly enumerated
list of tasks for the EU. Second, we have to split fiscal powers: the establishment
of a separate legislative branch of the EU that does state the principles of taxation
and another branch that makes policy inside those rules. Presently, however, often
majority by means of the European Commission and the European Parliament
does set the fiscal rules as well as does make policy inside those rules on a
seemingly endless list of possible tasks. Third, EU benefits should not be limited
to special groups or countries.
In the wake of the demise of the proposed Constitution, instead of the
present non-constitutional approach, a model constitution for the EU budget can
become an agenda-setting focal point for a future EU policy. A fiscal constitution
is a means proportionate to the problem at hand. A fiscal constitution (1) can be a
real possibility. In history, constitutional debate has always been possible and
fruitful. (2) It creates trust between the states. A shared framework facilitates a
robust democratic debate. (3) It makes subsidiarity a real possibility. The market
economy functions within a limited government. Moreover (4) it substitutes for
improving the morals between Member States. Just as the market economy does
the same by steering self-interested human behavior within a constitutional order
of private property.
In sum, the paper shows how we can use the reformed new EU budget by
imposing constraining rules to promote solidarity and trust in the setting of an EU
Leviathan. Instead of emphasizing effrciency, to up-date goals and means, and/or
to aim at greater fairness the paper shifts the emphasis to the making of authentic
+rules: the design of possible constraints on a revenue-maximizing EU."."u.rr.t0
of their voluntáry consent (an intemal criterion based on the desires of the Member
States themselves) it is acceptable to the Member States that are to be subject to it-
No extemal criteria, and hènce no agreement over the goodness or badness of
these criteria used, e.g., allocative effrciency or equal treatment for equals, are
necessary. The shared framework of a model EU budget (politically independent
fiscal rules) creates trust and social cohesion between the Member States, the
European parliament, Commission, and Council of Ministers. It facilitates a robust
demócratic debate within a consistent, transparent and reliable policy and
legislation framework. Member States can anticipate making appropriate behavior
adJustments, including those made over a long-term planning period' The paper
gives the analytical- arguments in support of three 
_ 
appropriately designed
budgetary measures (moderately permanent features) re the EU Budget Review: a
cteai lim-itation of tasks, a split in budgetary powers, and the rule of law applied to
budgetary benefits.
REFERENCES
Brennan, G. & J.M. Buchanan (2000). The Power to Tax, Anolytical Foundations
of a Fiscal Constitution.Indianapolis: Liberty Fund.
Buchanan, J.M. (1991). 'An American Perspective on Europe's Constitutional
Opportunity.' Cato Journal l0 (3): 619-629.
Buchanan, J.M. (1996a). 'Europe as Social Reality.' Constitutional Political
Ec.ongmy,7,253-256
Buchanan, J.M. (1996b). 'Federalism and Individual Sovereignty.' Cato Journal
15 Q-3):259-27s.
Buchanan, J.M. (2001). Choice, Contract, and Constitutions.Indianapolis: Liberty
Fund.
Buchanan, J.M. (2003). 'Public Choice. Politics without Romance.' Policy l9 (3):
13-18.
Buchanan, J.M (2005). 'Three Amendments: Responsibility, Generality, and
Natural Liberty,' C ato Unb ound, www. Cato-unbound. org'
Dircksen, J. (2005). Vote Tally Report 108-2. NTUF Policy Paper 156, www.
ntu.org.
11
Edwards, C. (2005). Downsizing the Federal Government. Washington: Cato
Institute.
Elster, J. (1991). 'Arguing and Bargaining in the Federal Convention and the
Assemblée Constituante.' Center for the Study of Constitutionalism ín Eastern
Europe, WorKng Paper no.4, August.
European Commission(2007). Reforming the Budget, Changing Europe. A public
Consultation Paper in view of the 200812009 budget review.
M. & R. Friedman U9791(1981). Free to Choose. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
Gillingham, J. (2003). European Integration 1959-2003. Superstate or New
Market Economy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hayek, F.A. (1939). Freedom and the Economic System. Public Policy Pamphlet,
No. 29. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
Hayek, F. A.ll944l (1986). The Road to Serfdom. London: Ark.
Hayek, F.A. (1949). 'The Economic Conditions of Interstate Federalism.' in:
Individuqlism and Economic Order. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
Hayek, F.A. (1960).Th" Constitution of Liberty. London: Routledge.
Hayek, F.A. (1982). Law, Legislation and Liberty. London: Routledge & Kegan
Paul.
Nef, R. (2002). Lob des Non-Zentralismus. Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag.
Snyder, J.R. (1998). 'Unrestrained Appetites, Unlimited Government.' Ihe
Freeman: Ideas on Liberty, Vol. 48 No. 5.
Sowell, T. (1999). The Quest for Cosmic Justice. New York: Touchstone.
Spicer, M.W. (1995). 'On Friedrich Hayek and Taxation: Rationality, Rules, and
Majority Rule.' National Tctx Journal a8 (1): I03-1I2.
Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (2004). Official Journal of the
European (Jnion C-310, Volume 47,16 December.
Treaty of Lisbon (2007). Officiat Journal of the European, Journal C-306,
Volume 50,3 December.
